While much research has examined the role of technology and marketing in moderating online user connections, how digital marketing motivates offline interactions among users is much less understood. Using a randomized field experiment involving 80,000 participants, we study how mobile messaging can leverage recipients' social ties to encourage blood donation. There are three main findings: first, both behavior intervention (in the form of reminder message) and economic reward (in the form of individual or group reward) increase donations, but only the messages with group reward are effective in motivating more donors to donate with their friend(s); second, group reward tends to attract different types of donors, especially those who are traditionally less active in online social setting; and third, across all treatments, message recipients donate a greater amount of blood if their friends are present. Structural estimation further suggests that rewarding group donors is four times more cost-effective than rewarding individual donors. Based on the structural estimates, we perform policy simulations on the optimal design of mobile messaging. The method of combining structural model and randomized field experiment opens new frontiers for research on leveraging digital marketing to mobilize a user's social network for social good.
Extended Abstract
Information technology has greatly reduced the communication and coordination cost among individuals. As a result, individuals are connected online and offline, ready to influence each other's behavior on an unprecedented scale. In light of this trend, organizations have increasingly used social interventions (Godes et al. 2005 , Luo et al. 2014 , Shriver et al. 2013 , Valente 2012 , but academic research is lagged behind. More specifically, a large stream of literature has studied online information sharing (Aral and Walker 2012 , Bapna and Umyarov 2014 , Ma et al. 2014 , while much less is known about how firms use digital interventions to improve offline social interaction. As Aral (2015) points out, "…there remains a danger in relying too heavily on digital substrates to explore human behavior. Not only are digital samples biased toward those who are more active online, potentially missing large swaths of society, but limiting inquiry to digital behaviors constrains the theoretical reach of experimental work." Hence Aral (2015) calls for networked experiments to link online treatment with offline response.
Our study is one attempt to answer this call. Specifically, we use mobile messaging to leverage recipients' social ties for an important offline behavior -blood donation. Blood shortage is prevalent worldwide, partly due to the low level of voluntary donation, especially among developing countries (WHO 2015) . While individual incentives are important 1 , recent literature finds that donors behave differently when surrounded by other donors or watched by third-party observers (Goes et al. 2014 , Shriver et al. 2013 , Toubia et al. 2013 , Jabr et al. 2013 , Ozbay and Ozbay 2014 , Ariely et.al. 2009 ). Such a group effect usually leads to more donations, although its effectiveness depends on group size (Zhang and Zhu 2011), group composition (Chen and Li 2009), and information structure (Chen et al. 2010) . In light of this literature, our study offers a new approach to address the global challenge of blood shortage. Up till now, most studies on group effects employ a researcher-controlled environment that defines group exogenously. In reality donor groups are often formed endogenously even before the charitable event organizer greets any potential donor. Therefore, important questions are left unanswered such as: Why do people donate or not donate as a group? What kinds of individuals are more likely to donate as a group? How can we encourage potential donors to form a group? In this paper, we examine how to take advantage of endogenous group formation to increase donation in a real world setting.
There are multiple reasons why leveraging endogenous group formation can be more beneficial to society than addressing each donor separately. First, donating in front of a friend may generate a more positive social image or warm glow. Second, to the extent that friends are alike, the friend of an active donor is likely a prospective donor. Third, coming to the charitable event together may generate a shared experience valuable to both the donor and her friend. This will in turn enhance the likelihood of the two coming as a group. Fourth, if we can identify what types of donors are more likely to enjoy group donation, reaching out to them can have a long run ripple effect that further spread the benefits of group donation.
If it is so desirable to donate as a group, why don't all donors already donate in a group? One explanation is coordination failure: a donor may need to reach out to her friend and educate him/her about the charitable event, and to coordinate schedule and transportation. Another explanation reflects more fundamental issues such as negative peer pressure (Calvó-Armengol and Jackson 2010): the donor may be reluctant to ask a friend to donate together if doing so amounts to asking for a favor or imposing social pressure on the friend. Whether the lack of group donation is due to coordination failure or negative peer pressure, we argue that encouraging group donation has a potential to improve Pareto efficiency. For example, suppose group donation can generate an extra benefit of $1,000 to the charity (as compared to solo donation), but it does not occur because the private benefit of group donation is only $500 to the donor and her friend, while the coordination cost and the negative social pressure of asking or being asked sum up to $600. In this case, the charity can offer a $200 reward for group donation, which allows the donor and her friend to receive a net benefit of $100 via group donation and the charity to realize a net benefit of $800.
To study ways to motivate group donation, we collaborated with a Chinese blood bank and conducted a large field experiment in December 2014. We randomly assigned 80,000 potential donors into seven test groups. The first one is a control group with 14,000 subjects. For the remaining six groups (with 11,000 subjects in each), we sent out a mobile message and varied its content across groups. The message content explored two tools to overcome the hurdle of group donation. One is behavioral intervention: some treatments do not mention group donation at all, while the others explicitly request a potential donor to donate together with friend(s). The second tool is providing economic reward for solo or group donation. Our experimental design incorporates six combinations of these two tools (Table 1) .
In particular, message 1 only reminded subjects to donate, message 2 added an explicit reward for donation (a supermarket voucher that is worth 30-50 RMB, equivalent to 6-8.3 US dollars). The average daily wage in this city in 2014 was about 100 RMB, so the reward amount is non-trivial. Neither message 1 nor 2 mentions group donation. In message 3, we reminded the subject to donate with friend(s), but did not mention the reward for donation; message 4 included both a reminder for donating with friend(s) and the economic reward. Note that in both message 2 and message 4, the reward is presented as reward per donor, without any condition on whether the donor comes alone or with friend(s). Message 5 is similar to message 4, except that we made the reward conditional on donating with friends ("…if you and your friend(s) donate together, each one of you will get a reward of…"). Message 6 is similar to message 4, but highlighted additional gifts available for all donors that come in group ("… you will get a reward of … upon donation. If you and your friend(s) donate together, each one of you will get an additional gift."). Table 1 summarizes the behavioral intervention and economic rewards in each treatment group, together with their corresponding parameters in our model (introduced in Section 3). For every donor who showed up during the experiment period, we also conducted a detailed survey that includes questions on their perception of social image and donating in a group.
Our experiment generates three main findings. First, a subject's donation decision -none, solo, or group donation -depends on both the reminder to donate and the economic reward for donation. Compared with the control group, receiving a message that encourages donation (message 1) has a positive effect on the overall donation rate, but receiving a message that encourages donation with a friend (message 3) has no significant effect. This suggests that simply mentioning group donation does not work: while the message reminds donors of the pleasure of donating with a friend, it also increases the perceived costs associated with getting a friend and convincing him to donate, which might even backfire and hurt donation rate. When we added economic reward to the mobile message (messages 2,4,5,6), the effect on donation rate is always positive and significant, but the effect is of the largest magnitude when the reward is conditional on donating with friends (message 5). Not only does the conditional message lead to a higher donation rate from message recipients, but these recipients are also more likely to bring friends who also donate at the same time.
The second main finding is that different messages tend to attract different types of donors. Thanks to our randomization design, all seven control and treatment groups are similar in all observable demographics. However, the donors that respond to message 5 (with economic reward conditional on group donation) are more likely to be married, to be older than 35, to have local resident permit (hukou) in the city, and to have donated more times before the experiment than donors responding to other messages. Survey results confirm that donors responding to message 5 are more willing to share the donation experience with family and friends, to bring a friend next time, and to believe that some of their friends do not donate due to lack of encouragement from others.
Thirdly, across all treatments, message recipients donate a greater amount of blood if their friends are present, regardless of whether their friends donate or not. This confirms the group effect demonstrated in the literature, and suggests that a friend's presence provides another margin to increase donation even if the friend does not donate.
Our structural estimates confirm the findings from reduced-form estimates and provide additional insights on the optimal design of incentive scheme and targeting strategy. We find that rewarding group donors is more than four times cost effective than rewarding individual donors in motivating blood donation, as the bank only needs to reward donors who come in groups and enjoy even more donation amount per group donor. In addition, the blood bank can take advantage of the large heterogeneity in the population and target group rewards on female donors who are local, married and highly educated, to generate even higher cost-benefit efficiency in increasing blood supply. Altogether, the field experiment suggests that charities can leverage endogenous group formation to stimulate voluntary donation, but only if it is bundled with appropriate economic reward. With group reward conditional on donating together with friends, charities can attract a special group of donors that are more pro-social and more likely to share donation experience and recruit donors through their social networks.
